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ABSTRACT

KEYWORDS

Historically, federal and state legislation placed different
conditions on same- and opposite-sex couples’ ability to marry,
adopt, or exercise their parental rights. Given the historical
intertwining of marriage and parenting, legal issues remain
hinged on differing conceptions of marriage and what constitutes
a legal family in the United States, especially for same-sex
partners compared to their different-sexed couple counterparts.
This article provides a historical review of decisions that serve as
the foundation for queer parenting rights in the United States. A
key focus is on the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court Obergefell v.
Hodges (2015) marriage decision on queer parenting and its
relevance to researchers and practitioners whose work involves
queer families. State discrepancies continue to exist for the
treatment of parental rights in spite of the legalization of samesex marriage. Finally, suggestions are provided for future
directions for the ﬁeld.

Families; gays and lesbians;
law; Obergefell v. Hodges;
parental rights; parents

Introduction
Throughout the history of the United States, marriage and family rights have
often been inseparably bound, with government-sanctioned nuptials operating
as a key gatekeeper to many parent and family freedoms. For decades, a lack
of access to the institution of marriage prevented gay and lesbian individuals
and couples from exercising fully recognized and sanctioned parentage (Wolfson, 2007). When the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges
(2015) extended marriage rights to same-sex couples across the country, the
civil rights landscape for gay and lesbian citizens changed (Huntington, 2015;
Leib, 2015). The ramiﬁcations of the Obergefell decision extend beyond marriage to inﬂuence parenting rights for same-sex couples by changing the interpretation and application of family law related to queer parenting issues and
moving toward greater equity in the treatment of different-sex and same-sex
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parenting couples (Lenhardt, 2015; NeJaime, 2016). Justice Kennedy illustrated
the historical legal and practical entanglement of marriage and parenting as
he delivered the opinion of the court, stating:
Many same-sex couples provide loving and nurturing homes to their children, whether
biological or adopted…. Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage
offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser and
are… relegated through no fault of their own to a more difﬁcult and uncertain family life.
The marriage laws at issue here thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples. (Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015, p. 6)

The Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) ruling represents a co-evolution of same- and
different-sex marriage and parenting rights occurring over decades from prior legal
designations and decisions (Cooper, 2015; Eskridge, 2015). Ultimately, marriage
for gay U.S. citizens also creates new legal opportunities for same-sex couples to
practice their right to the fulﬁllment and comfort of legally sanctioned parenting
(Strasser, 2015). Accordingly, state and federal courts have shifted interpretations
of the application of constitutionally protected parenting rights, sometimes in contradictory directions (Powell, 2015; Strasser, 2015). One remaining challenge is to
reconcile differing enforcements of marriage and parenting codiﬁed across statutes
and states. Marriage equality does not allay challenges in all family compositions,
nor does it change regulations connecting parenting with biology or gender. Policy
makers and advocates must now address inequalities in the application of parental
rights laws. Over the past three decades, popular and legal perceptions of families
headed by same-sex couples shifted toward greater acceptance in social, political,
and legal spheres (see van Eeden-Mooreﬁeld & Alvarez, 2015). This perceptual
shift occurred, in part, by demonstrating how discrimination negatively affected
multiple aspects of life, including but not limited to health, economic prosperity,
education, and housing (see Biblarz & Savci, 2010).
The current article provides an overview of quintessential legal decisions that have
advanced the historical development of parenting rights among same-sex couples
with biological or adopted children. First, a brief historical review of decisions that
serve as the foundation to parenting rights is provided, highlighting those that
changed access to parenting for queer individuals and same-sex couples up to the
Obergefell (2015) decision. Second, we focus on how the 2015 Obergefell v. Hodges
decision alters the parenting landscape. In doing so, we identify areas of future
research into the experiences and parenting needs of these families as well as key
understandings practitioners need to help these families connect legal decisions with
lived experiences. We acknowledge that other forms of families (e.g., families of
divorce, stepfamilies, and foster families) have an array of additional legal rights and
hurdles related to parenting. Given the specialized set of laws and circumstances surrounding these families, they are not included here (see van Eeden-Mooreﬁeld &
Alvarez, 2015). Finally, because our focus is on same-sex couples with children
(though we do not suggest two parents are required for positive childrearing), we
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reﬂect the legal language and conceptualization with our use of the terms same-sex
and queer rather than GLBT.
The freedom to marry and raise a family

Legal conceptions of marriage historically inﬂuenced parenting laws starting in
1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution granted citizens
the fundamental right to marriage. Within that amendment, the Due Process
Clause prohibits states from arbitrarily depriving persons of life, liberty, or property, and the Equal Protection Clause ensures rights must be protected equally
without discrimination against one class of individuals over another (Hinman,
2013). With few exceptions, the U.S. Supreme Court historically has upheld states’
autonomy to deﬁne and regulate marriage statutes. One such exception is in the
Full Faith and Credit Clause in Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution that
obliges courts in one state to honor the judgments by courts in other states (e.g.,
marriage licenses), though it has some important limitations related to parenting
rights, described later (Cruz, 2011). Much of marriage law remained relatively
unchanged for decades until Loving v. Virginia (1967) extended the Fourteenth
Amendment clauses to allow marriage between persons of any race. Doing so
changed the way U.S. citizens viewed marriage and, by extension, family
(Lenhardt, Cooper, Foster, & Katyal, 2008). The intertwined relationship between
marriage and parenting can be connected to ideas about the function of matrimonial arrangements. Their legislation is reviewed from two basic conceptions of
marriage: conjugal and consent-based (Girgis, George, & Anderson, 2012; see
United States v. Windsor, 2013).
Conjugal conception of marriage

Until the late twentieth century, the Supreme Court held a conjugal view of marriage that inseparably tied it with procreation and societal interests in regulating
adult sexual activities (Girgis et al., 2012). The conjugal view posits that marriage
is a permanent and exclusive union between a man and a woman fulﬁlled by bearing and raising children (Girgis et al., 2012). Early Supreme Court positions held
that states had a valid interest in marriage as beneﬁcial not only to creating a stable
family structure, but also toward advancing the moral and cultural traditions of
society (United States v. Windsor, 2013). In Loving v. Virginia (1967), Perry v.
Schwarzenegger (2010), and Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), the court strengthened
the argument that marriage is fundamental to creating a civilized society and
ensuring the survival of humanity.
Defense of marriage act
The 1996 federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) deﬁned marriage as a union
between a man and a woman and banned same-sex marriage based on the conjugal
deﬁnition. DOMA granted states the right to ban same-sex unions (through
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mini-DOMAs; see 28 U.S.C. x 1738C) and deny legal recognition of same-sex marriage licenses granted in other states (United States v. Windsor, 2013). It was
enacted soon after a major step toward same-sex marriage occurred in Baehr v.
Lewin (1993) when the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that gay couples might have
the right to marry based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Same-sex marriage
proponents argued that such denials were injurious and placed same-sex partners
in a class denied the beneﬁts and social standing derived through marriage (United
States v. Windsor, 2013). The Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Windsor
(2013) invalidated as unconstitutional Section 3 of DOMA, which restricted the
legal recognition of marriage to different-sex unions.
The federal DOMA and state-level DOMAs represent attempts to strengthen
legal and social connections between different-sex marriage and parental rights by
giving preference to the rights of wedded different-sex couples to enjoy the beneﬁts
of raising children (Rosato, 2006). Prior to United States v. Windsor (2013), the
Supreme Court consistently afﬁrmed the importance of procreation as an essential
part of marriage because children meet both the liberty interests (see Table 1 for
deﬁnitions of legal terms used throughout) of adults to enjoy raising children and
the needs of society as a necessary good to perpetuate humanity (Becker, 2012).
Consent-based conception of marriage

Over time, the procreation-marriage link has diminished signiﬁcantly, with states
and the Supreme Court moving toward a consent-based conception deﬁned “as
the solemnization of mutual commitment—marked by strong emotional attachment and sexual attraction between two persons” (United States v. Windsor, 2013,
x1156). Its acceptance has beneﬁtted legal recognition of same-sex marriage in
Table 1. Deﬁnition of terms used in addressing marriage and parental rights.
Term
Rights
Parental liberty
interest
Child liberty interest
Best interest
Harm standard
Processes
Adoption
Joint adoption
Roles
First parent
Legal/ﬁrst Parent
Nonbiological parent
Second-parent/
Coparent adoption
Adoptive parent(s)

Deﬁnition
A parent’s right to care, custody, and oversight of a child
A child’s right to receive care, custody, and oversight by a parent
In family law, the process of determining child custody and care arrangements for
optimal physical and emotional development
Evidence of an act of serious harm or neglect to a child
Act of an adult securing legal parentage rights and responsibilities
Act of two adults jointly securing legal parentage rights and responsibilities
A child’s biological or legally recognized adoptive parent
Adult who resides with a child and is legally recognized as a parent; supports the
child’s ﬁnancial, emotional, educational, and health needs
A person considered a child’s parent due to having a considerable presence in the
child’s life despite a lack of legal custody
Legal process through which a child is adopted by a second parent in an unmarried
couple (gay, lesbian, or heterosexual) either jointly with the legal ﬁrst parent or
another parental adult, or individually
Adult(s) who gain(s) legally recognized caretakers with parental rights and
responsibilities
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cases of adoption, custody, and support issues. In several cases, the marriage-procreation link was set aside in favor of the consent-based conception of marriage as
illustrated in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health (2003). In Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010), the California court supported same-sex marriage as a union
between two individuals for the purpose of obtaining personal fulﬁllment, happiness, emotional support, and to demonstrate public commitment to the civil union.
In United States v. Windsor (2013), the Supreme Court discussed marriage in relation to the Equal Protection Clause without reference to procreation. Marriage was
discussed as a basic civil right allowing personal choices in matters of coupling
without government interference. In Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), same-sex couples
sued Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee state agencies to challenge samesex marriage bans and refusal of recognition of legal marriages performed in other
states, alleging such actions violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process
Clause. Together, all aforementioned decisions effectively weakened the power of
the state and the federal government to deﬁne domestic relations exclusively in
heteronormative terms and more in terms of the protected fundamental liberty
interest rights of marriage and parenting afforded all U.S. citizens under the U.S.
Constitution.
Foundational parenting rights

Liberty interests—the legal right to life, liberty, and property—serve as a foundation for parenting rights. Liberty interests are linked to the aforementioned constitutional clauses guiding decades of policy designed to preserve the parent-child
relationship from the perspective of both parents (through parent liberty interests)
and children (through child liberty interests; Becker, 2012). Liberty interests of
parents are considered fundamental to the pursuit of happiness because parents
have the right to companionship, care, custody, and management of children. As
early as 1923, courts determined that government interference in childbearing and
raising children infringed upon protections in the Due Process Clause (Meyer v.
Nebraska, 1923; see Table 2). In Zablocki v. Redhail (1978), the Supreme Court
found such actions also violated the rights associated with marriage and a year later
in 1979, held that the parental liberty interest granted parents control to direct the
rearing of their children (Parham v. J.R.) and, subsequently, a fundamental right to
custody (In re Gentry, 1985).
Although both adults and children have liberty rights to experience the security
and beneﬁt of parent-child relationships, the issue recognizing children’s rights in
courts is complex and mixed. In some instances, the judicial system has recognized
that children have a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining parent-child
bonds (see Troxel v. Granville, 2000; Ward v. San Jose, 1991). In Troxel v. Granville
(2000), the Supreme Court recognized and to some extent elevated consideration
given to the liberty interests of children by noting that children have a right to preserve intimate parent and family relationships (see also Frazier v. Goudschaal,
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Table 2. Important foundational and same-sex parental rights cases.
Issue
Right to marry and
have a family
Right to bear/raise
children
Parental and child
liberty interests

Case
Zablocki v. Redhail (1978)
Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)
Parham v. J. R. (1979)
In re Gentry (1985)
Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

Right to relationship
with a parent
Best interest of the child
standard and child
liberty interest

Finlay v. Finlay (1925)
Prince v. Massachusetts
(1944)
In re H.S.H.-K. (1995)
Varnum v. Brien (2009)

Rowell v. Smith (2013)
Best interest of the child
standard and
parental ﬁtness

Stanley v. Illinois (1972)

Guinan v. Guinan (1984)
Gotlieb v. Gotlieb (1985)
Best interest of the child
standard and
parental ﬁtness

In re B.L.V.B. (1993)

In re Adoption of T.K.J.
(1996)

Baker v. State (1999)

Della Corte v. Ramirez
(2012)

Decision
State interference with family autonomy infringes
on the fundamental right to marry.
State interference with family autonomy can
infringe on parental fundamental rights.
Parents have a right to act in the best interest of
their children and direct upbringing
Parents have a right to the custody of their
children.
Certain fundamental liberty interests apply to
homosexual persons as a class; ﬁrst case to
decriminalize sodomy.
The court can exercise power as parens patriae to
decide the best care for children.
The state’s interest in protecting children overrides
parental liberty interest to direct the
upbringing of their children.
Wisconsin recognized the nontraditional adult
relationship of a same-sex couple as legitimate,
allowing the nonlegal parent standing.
State statute denying same-sex civil unions
violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court
also admitted the government lacked reliable
scientiﬁc data to support the claim that
opposite-sex couple parents are superior to
same-sex couple parenting.
Upon relationship dissolution of same-sex parents
of a child born through ART, the non-biological
coparent was given the right to visitation.
Fundamental liberty interest recognized by the
court. Due process entitles parents to a hearing
on ﬁtness as parents before children taken
from them. Parental right to maintain a parentchild relationship and bond.
The mere fact that a parent is homosexual does
not render the parent unﬁt and is a factor in
guardianship only if shown to impact the
child’s well-being.
Vermont court ruled that a lesbian partner could
adopt without terminating the partner birth
mother’s parental rights; led to changes in
state statute allowing same-sex second-parent
adoptions without conﬂict from natural
parents.
Colorado court ruled an unmarried lesbian couple
did not have the right under state adoption
statutes to adopt each other’s children. Court
declined to consider the best interest of the
child and instead relied on a strict
interpretation of state adoption statute.
No clear evidence that opposite-sex parenting is
superior to same-sex parenting. The Vermont
constitution gave same-sex couples the same
beneﬁts as opposite-sex couples and allowed
children born from a heterosexual union to be
adopted by a homosexual adoptive parent.
Massachusetts held that married same-sex couples
do not have the right to adopt children born
during marriage (even through ART). First case
to discuss legal gay marriage and parenting.
(Continued)
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Table 2. (Continued )
Issue

Case

Second-parent
adoptions

In re Adoption of Evan (1992)

Best interest of the child
and parental ﬁtness

Florida Dep’t Health and
Rehab. Servs. v. Cox (1993)
Cox v. Florida Dep’t Health
and Rehab. Servs. (1995)
In re Adoption of Tammy
(1993) In re Adoption of
Caitlin (1994)
Lofton v. Dep’t of Children &
Families (2004)

Resendes v. Brown (2009)
Joint adoption/
amended birth
certiﬁcate

In re M.D.D. & B.H.M. (1995)

Davenport v. Little-Bowser
(2005)

Finstuen v. Crutcher (2007)

Decision
First case in which New York court approved
second-parent adoption of nonlegal parent in
same-sex partnership.
Florida court upheld state ban of homosexual
adoptions; overturned two years later.
Upon relationship dissolution of same-sex parents
of a child born through ART, the non-biological
coparent was given the right to visitation.
First time a federal court addressed the issues
of homosexual adoption. The court ruled that
homosexuals did not have a fundamental
right to adopt or sexual privacy, and
reasonably related to the best interest
of the child standard.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a
parental agreement naming a nonparent as
guardian does not confer parental status.
Washington, DC court held that an unmarried
same-sex couple in a committed relationship
could jointly adopt a child, even though one
parent already had adopted the child.
Same-sex families in New York and Washington,
DC used their state courts to adopt children
born in Virginia, but Virginia refused to amend
birth certiﬁcates to include both same-sex
partners citing the state’s anti-same sex
marriage. Virginia Supreme Court ruled that
birth certiﬁcates must include the names of
both same-sex adoptive parents when a valid
adoption decree and birth certiﬁcate of the
child is provided.
After same-sex parents were listed on Oklahoma
birth certiﬁcates as parents of a child adopted
in another state, the state legislature passed a
law denying recognition of out-of-state
adoptions by same-sex couples. The U.S. Court
of Appeals ruled the same-sex parent ban as
unconstitutional and ordered Oklahoma to
recognize an same-sex adoptions on birth
certiﬁcates.

2013). In Rowell v. Smith (2013), the court ruled that both separated same-sex partners who had a child through assistive reproductive technology (ART; e.g., through
artiﬁcial insemination or in vitro fertilization) were entitled to maintain parenting
rights based on the child’s liberty interest.
Some courts have taken the position that being raised in a loving, stable, and
ﬁnancially secure environment with individuals (biological or nonbiological) with
whom the child has formed an emotional and psychological attachment (e.g., Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 2003) supersedes a parent’s sexual orientation.
In Meldrum v. Novotny (2002), the South Dakota Supreme Court rendered its decision based on recognition and weight given to the child’s liberty interest rights. The
court justice noted that children are not property, but unique individuals with their
own rights. Therefore, based on parent and child liberty interests, interfering with
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the parent-child bond can be considered a constitutional infringement (see J. B. v.
Washington County, 1997) of parents’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
(see Doe v. Irwin, 1985; In re Gentry, 1983) and children’s Fourth Amendment
rights (see Malik v. Arapahoe County Department of Social Services, 1999). These
rights ensure that socially, morally, and legally, children and parents beneﬁt from
staying bonded as a family.
To safeguard children’s rights to life and liberty afforded by their liberty rights,
the courts are tasked with considering those child custody and care arrangements
based on the best interest of the child standard (Children’s Bureau, 2010; Finlay v.
Finlay, 1925). When parents are in disagreement over what is best for their children, the court may intervene by acting as parens patriae, children’s legal protectorate. Then, each parental relationship is examined, reviewed for the quality of
relationship closeness, past parental involvement, and the ability to meet children’s
future needs. The duty to regulate child protection is critical and supersedes the
parental right to direct childrearing preferences (Prince v. Massachusetts, 1944),
which beneﬁcially ensures children have access to food, shelter, safety, and emotional security. Judges weigh legal perspectives from best interests and parental
rights with social perceptions of familial needs (Holtzman, 2014). However, interpretations of child protection have been wide, and have often been used to deny
parents who are part of a same-sex couple access to their children under the guise
of harm protection. Historically, state courts held that the best interest of the child
was optimally derived from a stable environment that nurtured the parent-child
bond best achieved through being raised in a married, different-sex parent family
structure (Holtzman, 2014; Kellman, 2006). Holding that same-sex couple parent
relationships were detrimental to the best interest of the child, states used the
power of the court to act as parens patriae to assert preference for ruling in favor
of the opposite-sex couple in custody, visitation, and support cases (Diekema,
2004).
The child liberty interest also ensures that children have guardianship by capable adults with appropriate parental ﬁtness (Cooper & Cates, 2006). The Due Process Clause entitles parents to a hearing to determine their ﬁtness before removal
(Stanley v. Illinois, 1972). Although these standards have served to protect children
from harm, they have also been used to bar queer individuals and couples from
parenting rights (Washington, 2012). Two additional constitutional clauses guarantee parental rights. The Full Faith and Credit Clause is used to ensure that legal
parental status established in one state is recognized in another (Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 2005). Though automatic recognition of parental status from another
state is not required (and still does not protect families headed by same-sex couples
in all situations), the clause does demand recognition of decrees (e.g., adoption)
obtained from an out-of-state court even if the judgment violates the public policy
of another state (Joslin & Minter, 2012; Woods, 2014). Additionally, the Equal Protection Clause protects the parent-child relationship by guaranteeing that states
cannot deny equal protection of the law. However, it does not explicitly stipulate
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that every law must be applied equally to every citizen (Krause, 1971). Courts typically apply high thresholds when determining if rights guaranteed under the discussed clauses have been violated and usually require that same-sex equality cases
include strong, abundant evidence to challenge discriminatory laws (Chemerinsky,
2006).
Assistive reproductive technology and adoption

Biological parentage is demonstrated through evidence of giving birth or being
identiﬁed as a parent through natural sex or ART (Goldberg, 2010). When a different-sex married couple has a child through ART, nearly every state grants both
parents legal status and equal rights regardless of biological connection to the child
(Joslin, 2010; NeJaime, 2016). Parental status through adoption is granted contingent on court order or decree establishing parental ties and constitutionally protected parental rights (Cooper & Cates, 2006; Garcia, 2007). The application of
parental rights varies based on the legal parent status recognized by the state for a
married or unmarried individual in a different-sex or same-sex couple (Woods,
2014). The most common parental designations include: (a) ﬁrst parent, who has
primacy in the court based on the superior parental rights doctrine and thus takes
precedence over other individuals; and (b) second parent, whose rights in comparison to a ﬁrst parent vary by state (Becker, 2012; In re T.P.S., 2012).
Many states impose explicit provisions dictating that the law of a child’s home
state be applied in the determination of his or her legal parentage (Woods, 2014).
In those states, birthplace or residence holds no weight and the ﬁrst parent is recognized as the legal parent (see Uniform Parentage Act, 2002). States with bans on
same-sex civil unions and marriages often denied parental status and rights to a
nonlegal parent of a child produced from the same-sex union (e.g., Miller-Jenkins
v. Miller-Jenkins, 2006). In states with statutes unclear on gay and same-sex couple
adoptions, the court judges have had wide latitude on their rulings, which often
reﬂect their personal beliefs (Bruni, 1995). In fact, both the law and the language
used to create and argue parental rights inherently favor the biological parent, delegitimizing nonbiological parents through legal language that refers to them as
“nonparents.” Since one or both parents in a same-sex union may be nonbiological
parents, queer families face a greater and more consistent threat of being separated
or reconﬁgured than their different-sex counterparts.
Adoption is granted at the discretion of the state as parens patriae to award to a
couple or an adoptive individual based on application of the best interest of the
child standard (Knepper, 1994). Since states regulate adoption, laws and criteria
may vary across states. In fact, the Supreme Court ruled that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not compel one state to recognize the decision of a sister state
(Baker v. General Motors Corp., 1998). Adoptions are ﬁnalized by a court order or
decree that gives the adoptive parent full parental rights (Hollinger, 2004). Adoptive parents then petition the state of the child’s birth for an amended birth
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Table 3. State recognition and prohibition of individual, joint, and second-parent adoption by
queer individuals and couples.
Permitted
Throughout
the State

Permitted in
Some Jurisdictions

Individual
All states and the
adoption
District of Columbia
Joint adoption CA, CT, IL, ME, MA, NH,
NY, OR, District
of Columbia
Second-parent CA, CO, CT, IL, MA, NJ,
adoption
NY, PA, VT, District
of Columbia

NH

DE, IN

No Explicit
Prohibition

Not Permitted Unclear

AK, AL, AZ, CO, DE, GA, HI,
AR, FL, MI, MS,
ID, IA, IN, KS, KY, LA, MD,
NC, OH, UT
MN, MO, MT, ND, NE, NM,
NV, OK, PA, RI, SC, SD, TN,
TX,, VA, VT, WA, WV, WY
AK, AL, AZ, DE, GA, HI, ID, IA, AR, KY, NE,
IN, KS, KY, LA, MD, ME, MI
OH, WI
MN, MO, MS, MT, NC, ND,
NE, NH, NM, NV, OK, OR,
PA, RI, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT,
VA WA, WV, WY

WI

Note. Information available as of January 2016.

certiﬁcate to replace the biological parents’ names with those of the adopters (Uniform Adoption Act, 1994) to reﬂect the ﬁnalized adoption, accurately identify a
child’s legal parents, and serve as personal identiﬁcation (Hollinger, 2004; see
Table 3). All states are members of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children that governs interstate adoptions (West, 2013); adoption laws may be recognized across the country unless they are intrastate adoptions limiting recognition
to state boundaries.

Parenting rights for same-sex couples before constitutional marriage rights

States often treat situations involving same-sex and different-sex relationships differently, particularly when determining harm-causing contexts based on the best
interest of the child, or the harm standard (DeVille & Kopelman, 1999). Historically, state courts have held that marriage provides a stable environment that nurtures the parent-child bond and that the best outcomes for children are achieved
when they are raised in a married, different-sex family structure (Kellman, 2006).
States’ authority to make such judgments is based on the premise that children are
vulnerable both to their environment and their caretakers (Hall, Pulver, & Cooley,
1996). In cases involving same-sex marriages with children, courts traditionally
used homosexuality as a determinant of parental unﬁtness, and denied or ignored
the signiﬁcance of the child-parent bond formed with both parents regardless of
the parent’s legal status (In re Adoption of J.M.G., 1987; Joslin, 2010). Since the
1970s when families headed by same-sex couples became part of the legal parentage landscape, state and federal decisions reﬂected this shift in family deﬁnition,
particularly in the period between the 1980s and 2000s when a number of state
cases pushed the evolution of parentage law (Alvare, 2014). During that period,
several case rulings weakened links between states’ interests as parens patriae and
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marriage, procreation, and child rearing within the traditional different-sex, marriage-based family context (Alvare, 2014).
An important change occurred in 1995 when a state court recognized changing
attitudes about homosexuality and ruled that a queer person could be a ﬁt parent
(In re Perlman). In 1995, the Wisconsin Supreme Court expanded the interpretation of liberty interests to include same-sex citizens when it ruled, taking into consideration the parent-child bond, that a lesbian parent with no legal parent
designation was entitled to visitation rights of her former partner’s legal child
(Holtzman v. Knott, 1995; see In re H.S.H.-K., 1995). It was one of the ﬁrst cases
involving liberty rights where the court recognized the “nontraditional adult
relationship” (gay) of the former partner and viewed as legitimate the connection
between both parents and the child (In re H.S.H.-K., 1995). Similarly, in Rowell v.
Smith (2013), the court ruled that both same-sex partners, regardless of relationship or marital status, who had a child through ART were entitled to maintain parenting rights based on the child’s liberty interest. By granting custody to a queer
biological parent, the court provided support that families headed by same-sex
couples were not automatically child-harming. In fact, research indicates that no
differences exist in developmental, psychological, and emotional outcomes
between children raised in different-sex families and those raised in families
headed by same-sex couples (Biblarz & Savci, 2010; Perrin et al., 2002); legal arguments for granting custody to a queer parent have been supported by these ﬁndings (Baker v. State of Vermont, 1999; Lofton v. Department of Children & Family
Services, 2004).
In making decisions concerning the best interest of the child, the court examines
factors pertaining to the child’s age, gender, physical and emotional well-being, as
well as more subjective factors that include parent lifestyle, morality, and ﬁnancial
contribution (Alvare, 2014; Cooper & Cates, 2006). For example, in Gottlieb v. Gottlieb (1985), the court restricted a gay father’s visitation with his children because
the father’s homosexual activities were deemed detrimental to the child’s wellbeing. The justiﬁcation for restricting parental rights was based on the assumption
that a “child’s sexual maturation and sense of sexual security must be safeguarded
so that the child will have proper identiﬁcation as to what the parent’s role model
should be…. and this applies equally to heterosexual or homosexual activity” (p.
182). However, in In re Evan (1992), the court concluded that parental sexual orientation should not be used as a sole or primary determinant in assessing possible
harm to a child.
In applying the best interest of the child standard to determine parental ﬁtness,
courts historically denied parental rights to same-sex couples based on the argument that they engaged in immoral and illegal acts (i.e., sodomy) that harmed the
child (Kaufman, 2009). Original antisodomy laws were founded on the premise
that engaging in nonprocreative relations was immoral; this standard applied both
to different-sex and homosexual behavior (Kaufman, 2009). Over time, states
amended the wording and use of antisodomy laws to apply speciﬁcally to same-sex
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behavior. In Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), the court reinforced legal discrimination
of same-sex couples by upholding a Georgia law criminalizing sodomy between
two consenting adults (Hagedorn, 2012; Kaufman, 2009). Antisodomy laws not
only criminalized the act of sodomy, but also opened the door for the discrimination of same-sex couples in other areas of life including child custody and adoption
(Kaufman, 2009).
In Bottoms v. Bottoms (1994) and ex parte J. M. F. (1998), the courts deemed a
same-sex parent unﬁt through application of the best interest of the child standard
supported by use of antisodomy laws to demonstrate that the parent engaged in
immoral and illegal acts that harmed the child (Naeger, 2004). Courts traditionally
held that a parent who engaged in a same-sex relationship was automatically an
unﬁt parent. However, being in a same-sex relationship was dropped as the sole
factor in determining parental unﬁtness (Doerhoff, 1999; Kaufman, 2009). For
example, in the case of Bottoms v. Bottoms (1994), on appeal, the decison was overturned based on the court’s determination that there was insufﬁcient evidence to
support the premise that a parent’s same-sex relationship had or would have had a
harmful effect on the child (Kaufman, 2009; Naeger, 2004).
In 2003, the Supreme Court ruling in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) invalidated the
criminalization of sodomy, effectively overruling Bowers v. Hardwick (1986;
Hagedorn, 2012). Sodomy laws were ruled unconstitutional by violating privacy
and due process guarantees (Hagedorn, 2012; Naeger, 2004). The decision in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) removed the morality basis for upholding criminalization of
same-sex relationships and provided support for the legal entitlement of equal
treatment in areas that included parental rights (e.g., custody and adoption) (Kaufman, 2009). The decisions in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) and the appeal of Bottoms
v. Bottoms (1995) lent support to the argument that the prevailing conception that
children were harmed by being raised by same-sex couples was unjustiﬁed and
unsupported (Naeger, 2004).
Establishing same-sex parental status and rights

Same-sex couples living in a committed relationship often birth children through
ART methods such as artiﬁcial insemination and in vitro fertilization, and periodically through surrogacy, though related case law comes primarily from differentsex scenarios (Alvare, 2014; Joslin, 2010). Treatment of same-sex parental status
when a child is conceived via ART varies across states (Alvare, 2014). Same-sex
parents have struggled to attain or maintain parental rights in cases involving a
child conceived through ART (Garcia, 2007). Through implied or literal language
in some state statutes (e.g., Delaware, New Mexico, North Dakota, Wyoming, and
the District of Columbia), legal parental status is granted to same-sex couples who
conceive a child through ART (Polikoff, 2009). Some states do grant equal parental
rights to biological and nonbiological parents for a child conceived through ART
even if parents are not legally married at the time of conception or birth (Joslin,
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2010). In those cases, the state treats the nonbiological parent as a ﬁrst parent
based on the presumption that this parent gave full consent to the conception of
the child through ART (Garcia, 2007; see Uniform Parentage Act [UPA], 2002). To
guarantee equal protection, attorneys commonly advise nonbiological parents to
become legal second parents through adoption, where possible, to ensure all states
recognize their parental rights (Becker, 2012). The revised 2002 UPA established
legal parentage for children conceived through ART, and deﬁned motherhood
with relevance for same-sex parents using ART, stating that the legal mother is the
woman who carries the child to birth, legally adopts the child, or is the legal surrogate and not the ova donor (UPA, 2002). The parental rights of the donor father
are terminated in most cases; however, the legal father could be recognized under
certain conditions. Attorneys suggest the use of legal agreements to strengthen
same-sex parent rights, including voluntary and coparenting agreements
(Althouse, 2008; Harris, 2012).
Voluntary coparenting agreement
As a means to strengthen parental claims for children born via ART, the UPA
allows same-sex parents to enter into a voluntary agreement that delineates parental status, child custody and support responsibilities, and removes claims to parenthood by the surrogate (Joslin, 2010). Parents sign an afﬁdavit of voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity or afﬁdavit of parentage immediately before or after
a child’s birth, which should be given Full Faith and Credit standing. However,
some states have denied same-sex parents agreed-upon rights, using legislation to
discriminate (Joslin, 2010).
Often among same-sex couples, the nonlegal parent acquires second-parent status that can diminish the rights of the ﬁrst parent (In re Paternity of F.T.R., 2013).
When a same-sex couple enters into a coparenting agreement, the nonbiological
parent can obtain second-parent status of the partner’s birth child; however, there
are disadvantages to this approach to establishing legal parent rights (E.N.O. v. L.
M.M., 1999). Even with a coparenting agreement, the ﬁrst parent still holds more
rights than the second parent (Resendes v. Brown, 2009). Moreover, a state can
actually ﬁnd a ﬁrst parent unﬁt for having entered into a coparenting agreement
based on a “contractual relinquishment of custody” (Rowell v. Smith, 2013). As
such, coparenting agreements do not guarantee full parenting rights to both partners in a couple, and this places families headed by same-sex couples consistently
at risk for separation (Joslin, 2010).
Adoption

Approximately 4% of adoptions in the United States are to same-sex couples
(Gates, Badgett, Macomber, & Chambers, 2007; Makadon, Mayer, Potter, &
Goldhammer, 2008). States differ in the types of adoption permitted for same-sex
couples (see Table 3) based on the best interest of the child standard, a standard
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used for decades by some states to keep families headed by same-sex couples from
adopting (Cooper & Cates, 2006). To dispute state bans on same-sex adoption,
legal teams must pass a strict scrutiny review where queer citizens are identiﬁed as
a suspect class experiencing differential treatment (see Romer v. Evans, 1996); to
date that has not yet happened. Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitation
Services v. Cox (1993) and Lofton v. Department of Children & Family Services
(2004) both challenged the constitutionality of laws banning same-sex adoption by
claiming the ban violated their parental liberty interest guaranteed in the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. In both cases, the court sided with
the state based on the premise that adoption was a statutory privilege and not a
fundamental liberty (Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitation Services v.
Cox, 1993).
Second-parent adoption
A number of conﬂicting state decisions highlight adoption policy variability. In a
1993 Vermont case (In re B.L.V.B.), a lesbian nonlegal parent was allowed to adopt
her partner’s child, while three years later in Colorado a similar case denied a lesbian couple’s adoption of each other’s children (In re Adoption of T. K. J., 1996).
Joint adoption
Based on public policy, states have restricted the rights of same-sex parents to joint
adoption under the guise of parens patriae safeguarding the best interest of the
child (Woods, 2014). Historically, in states banning same-sex marriage, out-ofstate joint adoption or legal parent status of a nonbiological parent has not been
recognized in the court unless granting legal parent status served the state’s interests (Hollinger, 2004; Woods, 2014). As a result, same-sex couples’ petitions for an
amended birth certiﬁcate from the child’s state of birth have been denied in several
states based on state statutes prohibiting joint adoptions or simultaneous individual adoption of a child to a same-sex couple (Cooper & Cates, 2006; see Perdue v.
Mississippi State Board of Health, 2003; Wigginton, 2014). Yet, other precedence
has allowed same-sex couple adoption (Wilson, 2008). For example, in the case of
In re M. M. D. (1995), joint adoption was allowed even after the child previously
had been legally adopted by one of the parents.
Amended birth certiﬁcates
Since many state bans against same-sex marriage barred unmarried adults from adopting either jointly or simultaneously, same-sex parents have often been unable to obtain
accurate birth certiﬁcates for their children (Cahill, Ellen, & Tobias, 2010). Where adoption has been recognized for same-sex couples, states have included restrictions against
joint adoption by denying parents an amended birth certiﬁcate that records both the
biological and nonbiological parent as legal parents (Adar v. Smith, 2011; Finstuen v.
Crutcher, 2007; West, 2014; Wigginton, 2014). The Supreme Court ruled in Picket v.
Brown (1983) that the unequal treatment of children having unmarried parents violated
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the Equal Protection Clause because the adopted child was penalized for the adoptive
parents’ marital status. Based on this precedent, same-sex couples have petitioned
the court, arguing that refusal to issue an amended birth certiﬁcate denies children
adopted by same-sex couples the rights and beneﬁts associated with an accurate
birth certiﬁcate (e.g., death beneﬁts, school registration, and health-care decisions;
Cahill et al., 2010; West, 2014). Finally, courts in some states that banned same-sex
marriage have allowed joint adoption based on the application of the best interest
standard (Woods, 2014). For example, in the cases of In re Adoption of Caitlin
(1993) and In re Adoption of Tammy (1993), an adoption decree was granted to a
same-sex couple because the home environment was deemed loving, nurturing,
supportive, and in the best interest of the child.
Summary of pre-Obergefell parental rights

As illustrated above, same-sex parental rights have been subject to varied and
inconsistent decisions across time and states, which largely hinged on differential
conceptualizations of marriage (see Table 3 for critical decisions). Before Obergefell, same-sex families with children through natural birth, adoption, and/or ART
were consistently disadvantaged in the legal system, even with legal parenting
agreements in place. Although both adults and children have been granted liberty
rights by the Constitution, legal recognition of children’s rights is complex and
considered with variable weight from case to case, especially in same-sex families.
States historically treated same-sex relationships as harmful to children, and
denied or ignored the child-parent bond when queer parents were involved,
despite research to the contrary (Biblarz & Savci, 2010). Without the uniformity of
constitutional same-sex marriage, full parental and familial legitimacy and rights
were positioned to remain unavailable to same-sex families across states in America. For the ﬁeld of family studies, the lack of recognition of same-sex marriage
limited investigations, understanding and applications of best practices for working with same-sex families, and inclusive conceptualizations of family.
Same-sex parenting rights after Obergefell

When a different-sex married couple has a child, both biological parents are automatically recognized as legal ﬁrst parents, even upon divorce. With same-sex couples, the same assumptions have not been granted historically. The constitutional
legalization of same-sex marriage from Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) extends signiﬁcant parental rights and legitimization to queer families. Previously, prohibitions
of marriage in some states and lack of recognition of valid marriages between states
disallowed married same-sex couples to be coparents named on birth certiﬁcates
with full parental rights (Cahill et al., 2010; West, 2014). They similarly disallowed
nonbirth-parent adoptions (West, 2014). Such central beliefs about the legitimacy
of same-sex relationships inﬂuenced designations of who and how long one is a
parent and under which circumstances those determinations are established or
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revoked (e.g., where couples are married before their children were born or
adopted). Now, all families have the ability to complete second-parent adoptions
(barring state bans or challenges), allowing both parents in a couple access to their
parental rights. The Obergefell decision shows that marriage equality can promote
access to parenthood for all families and diminishes the gap between same-sex and
different-sex couples (NeJaime, 2016).
However, the monumental change brought by Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) does
not necessarily confer full parenting recognition or protection. The beneﬁts largely
impact rights predicated on marital status, maintaining many of the discriminatory
family issues experienced by same-sex couples. Marriage itself may not protect
nonbiological or adoptive parents. In states allowing same-sex adoption, couples
may now be recognized as married adoptive parents, though not all states allow
openly gay or lesbian citizens to adopt. Same-sex couples who use donors or surrogates are not guaranteed full parental rights as they are subject to adoption laws;
some states speciﬁcally prohibit same-sex adoptions altogether, some allow only
single queer individuals to adopt, while others still require both a male and female
parent for birth certiﬁcates (LaPorte, 2013). Another critical challenge for queer
parents that was unaddressed with the Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) case was the
issue of the inability to transfer parental rights across state lines without a court
judgment. Legal issues that occur when a family travels or moves may be subject to
different state-based interpretations of parenthood and associated rights, even for
legally married couples.
The role of parent designations

Until Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), a common legal scenario for same-sex couples
jointly raising a child included one parent designated as the ﬁrst parent and the
other designated as a nonlegal parent, unless a court determined parental status of
the second parent and thus extended parental rights to the second parent (Becker,
2012). States vary on second-parenthood rights compared to those of ﬁrst parents
(see In re T. P. S., 2012), giving second parents in some states fewer rights than
others. As a result, same-sex coparents, equal in practical parental roles, are placed
in uneven legal guardianship positions. While DOMA violated federal constitutional rights that affected adoption, custody, visitation, and child support rights for
same-sex parents, the majority of second-parent adoption cases have been adjudicated within states’ court systems based on state laws (Cooper & Cates, 2006;
Garcia, 2007). Many states still ban same-sex couple adoption, but allow openly
queer individuals to adopt, relegating coparents to a lesser or nonlegal parental status with fewer rights. States that clearly permit same-sex second-parent adoptions
usually grant decrees barring a compelling reason for denial (Cooper & Cates,
2006; see In re M.M.D., 1995).
The constitutional rights of the ﬁrst parent may be less protected in situations in
which both parents act as coparents in the care and upbringing of a child (Garcia,
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2007; Logue, 2002). Where a ﬁrst parent did not object to a nonbiological parent’s
intent to adopt and the nonlegal parent treated the child as his or her own, formed
a psychological bond with the child, and lived as part of the family unit, a
second-parent designation is possible, even over the ﬁrst parent’s objections (see
Mancine v. Gansner, 2012). Though intended to honor coparents, this could also
allow former partners or spouses who did not terminate parental rights to challenge same-sex couples’ parenting rights. Such concerns are salient among lesbian
and gay couples where the child brought into the family is often from a previous
different-sex marriage (Gates, 2013). Finally, a nonlegal parent may be granted second-parent status in one setting but not in another, such as when there is no existing ﬁrst parent (Wilson, 2013) or when traveling to states that do not similarly
recognize the rights of same-sex parents.

Post-Obergefell parental rights decisions

Soon after the Obergefell ruling, in March 2016, an interstate custody dispute
occurred between two mothers who had been together for 17 years. The transferability of parental rights across state lines reached the U.S. Supreme Court (In re
V.L. v. E.L., 2016). E. L. gave birth to three children, and V. L. was allowed a second-parent adoption in Georgia. In Alabama, where the couple dissolved their
relationship, V. L. was allegedly denied access to the children, and when challenged, an Alabama court did not honor her Georgia adoption. The U.S. Supreme
Court later determined that Alabama’s decision violated the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, and overturned it. This case may foreshadow future court disputes around
same-sex adoption and parenting. While this case did not rely on Obergefell specifically, its inﬂuence was felt as the court’s perspective on same-sex parenting was
the same in both cases: treating the same-sex couple as any other couple. The case
was judged on the legal merits, previous parenting arrangements and agreements,
and both states’ interpretation of the law, without issue as to their ability to provide
adequate care due to sexual orientation.
Other cases have begun to beneﬁt from reviews that utilize the Obergefell ruling.
For example, in the case of In re Costanza (2014), the state of Louisiana linked
adoption to marriage. The state denied adoption to Costanza, the nonbiological
parent of a child born through ART to her lesbian partner. While the couple possessed a valid marriage license issued in California, it was not recognized in Louisiana. In July 2015, just days after the Obergefell ruling, the state attorney general
appealed the decision and won based on Obergefell’s expansion of the deﬁnition of
marriage (Bush, 2015). Following Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), married same-sex
petitioners who adopt a child and request an amended birth certiﬁcate have stronger foundations for their claim since denying the amended birth certiﬁcate based
on the same-sex couple not meeting the marriage requirement is no longer possible
(Bush, 2015).
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Discussion
Decades of decisions around marriage and parental rights co-evolved to produce
the Supreme Court ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), which has already had
implications for other cases (i.e., In re V.L. v. E.L., 2016). Since legal conceptions of
marriage have inﬂuenced parenting laws, the recent Supreme Court decision raises
the need for the reexamination of that relationship. For same-sex couples, marriage
has important implications related to establishing and exercising parental rights for
biological and adopted children (Joslin, 2005). Historically, same-sex couples have
been affected negatively by widely varying public policy and state laws regarding
marriage and parental rights. This population will continue to confront inequalities
until parent rights legally are treated uniformly across the country, regardless of
the family structure.
For the law to meet increased social acceptance of queer individuals and families, legal conceptualizations of family must expand. To do so, new policies must
be empirically grounded and address previous legal precedent and constitutional
clauses; as such, understanding key cases and precedent is critical for researchers
and practitioners. Importantly, we must set a modern research agenda with intent
to disseminate our new knowledge to policy makers. Of particular need is the
growing legal value placed on children’s liberty interests, adding validation to the
rights and perspectives of the child (Becker, 2012). Accordingly, future research
and practice must address such gaps in the literature and variations across the
community. Practitioners already working with these families and children have
access to everyday needs and perspectives. As such, we suggest any new agenda
begin with collaboration and sharing of information across researchers and
practitioners.
The Obergefell decision eased barriers to second-parent adoptions for nonbiological parents (NeJaime, 2016). Since court decisions can signiﬁcantly alter existing family structures and relationships by balancing the rights of biological and
nonlegal parents and the best interest of the child, the court has provided some
clarity about parental rights within a system that often has competing legal doctrines, although competing interests remain (Holtzman, 2014). Since courts are
moving away from granting parenting rights based heavily on a heteronormative
deﬁnition of “parent” and “marriage,” research and practice must follow suit. For
example, parenting laws and rulings often apply speciﬁcally to gay and lesbian
rather than uniformly to queer U.S. citizens. As other members of the queer community, such as transgender parents or polyamorous families, gain visibility in the
larger society, the law will need to adjust to include their parenting rights. For all
families to enjoy the constitutionally protected right to the fulﬁllment from having
children, legal assessments must also be made of regulations connecting parenting
with biology and gender and move beyond binary understandings of gender identity to include the whole spectrum of the GLBT and queer citizenry. Such information could, for instance, help guide family laws currently contingent upon ﬁxed
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gender assignments to include transgender parents. Currently, the needs and experiences of such members and others of the queer community are severely understudied. As such, there is scant research available to justify any policy suggestions
or understand the impact of current policies (Park, Kazyak, & Slauson-Blevins,
2015). Accordingly, a major focus of need areas for research and practice must
attend to variations across the community.
To ensure that the rights honor the spirit of Justice Kennedy’s concern to reduce laws
that “harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples,” same-sex adoption bans
must be addressed legally (Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015, p. 6). Such changes could increase
access for queer individuals and same-sex couples to adopt across the country. States
have laws that outline the parameters for the adoption of children by a nonbiological
single individual or a couple, giving them legal rights equivalent to those of a biological
parent (Joslin & Minter, 2012; Woods, 2014). Some states also recognize different- and
same-sex couples who bear children through ART as legal parents (Alvare, 2014). Even
so, although social conceptions of family have moved toward greater acceptance of the
diversity of family structures (e.g., different-sex couples and same-sex couples), most
states still require marriage as a condition of adoption (Bush, 2015). States that once
denied adoption based on claims that a same-sex marriage was not recognized as valid
now cannot use this as a condition for denial following the ruling in the Obergefell v.
Hodges (2015) case.
As conﬂicting parentage laws in states are increasingly examined, marriage rights do
not fully guarantee the safety of queer parenting rights. To increase that protection, legal
scholars recommend court-ordered parentage notices. As illustrated in In re V.L. v. E.L.
(2016), interstate adoptions may be recognized with greater frequency. Laws and their
perceptions may inﬂuence decisions around starting a queer family with children, as
well as decisions about where that family resides (Park, Kazyak & Slauson-Blevins,
2015). Further, since the experiences of being a queer family with children vary by the
degree of legal afﬁrmation in geographically speciﬁc laws and attitudes, future legal
shifts may help or hinder family acceptance. As changes continue, the implications
should be examined by researchers and by practitioners. In addition, since parental
rights still vary across states, a court-ordered parentage notice may protect children
when families move or travel.
Finally, the clarity around marriage bestowed by the Obergefell ruling highlights
the ambiguity in parental rights law and the inconsistency in custody, visitation,
and support issues both with couples in committed same-sex relationships and following the dissolution of a partnership or marriage (van Eeden-Mooreﬁeld et al.,
2011). Familial separation and blending are important areas to explore for queer
families through future legal practice and research. Although not a focus here,
these are critical areas of any future research and practice agenda.
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